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Abstract 
Different sub–disciplines of the social sciences analyse the evolution and diffusion of 
technical innovations from an institutional perspective. Important contributions are 
provided by socio–economic studies of national systems of innovation, by politico–
economic research on the varieties of capitalism, and by the sociology of technology. 
These studies often start from rather simple distinctions between types of technical in-
novations (e.g., radical versus incremental) which they usually do not elaborate on. 
Such “black–boxing” of technology by and large facilitates detecting generalizable re-
lations between institutional constellations and technical innovations. But a more so-
phisticated analysis of the relationship between institutions and technical innovations 
needs more precise concepts of both technology and institutions, and it must dismiss 
the prevailing institutional determinism. Processes of technical and institutional inno-
vations are characterised by co–evolution, interaction and mutual adjustment. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In verschiedenen sozialwissenschaftlichen Teildisziplinen wird die Entstehung und 
Ausbreitung technischer Innovationen aus einer institutionellen Perspektive analy-
siert. Wichtige Ansätze finden sich in der sozio–ökonomischen Forschung über nati-
onale Innovationssysteme, der politökonomischen Forschung über die Spielarten des 
Kapitalismus und der Techniksoziologie. Die Arbeiten gehen oft von einfachen Un-
terscheidungen zwischen bestimmten Typen von technischen Innovationen (z.B. ra-
dikal versus inkrementell) aus, die sie in der Regel nicht sehr viel weiter entwickeln. 
Dieses „black–boxing“ kann es erleichtern, generalisierbare Zusammenhänge zwi-
schen institutionellen Konstellationen und technischen Innovationen aufzuzeigen. 
Das ist bisher aber auch deshalb nur selten gelungen, weil ein Defizit hinsichtlich der 
theoretischen Konzeptualisierung von institutionellen Arrangements besteht und 
gleichzeitig ein institutioneller Determinismus vorherrscht. Die Analyse von Wech-
selwirkungen zwischen technischen und institutionellen Neuerungen als Prozessen 
der Koevolution, Interaktion und wechselseitiger Anpassung könnte Abhilfe schaffen. 
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1   Introduction1 
Institutionalism in its different facets has a long tradition in the analysis of social 
phenomena including the evolution and development of technical innovations. Insti-
tutional arrangements are regarded as coordinating and shaping collective action and, 
consequently, also influencing innovation policy. Although innovation policy ad-
dresses various kinds of innovation, this paper will concentrate on technical innova-
tions, product and process innovations. The studies to be reviewed examine the in-
vention, acquisition, application, development and diffusion of new technology. 
They reject technological determinism, which prevailed in technology studies for a 
long time, and, in most cases, treat technical innovation as the dependent variable.  
Innovation researchers have analysed technical innovations from various theoretical 
perspectives. This article is confined to studies which look at technical innovations 
from an institutional angle and examines what they contribute to the overall under-
standing of technical innovations and their repercussions. These approaches are not 
compared with other theories. Instead, the main focus lies on the spectrum of institu-
tional analyses of technical innovations, including studies which primarily focus on 
other variables, such as economic performance, and consider the capacity to innovate 
only because technical innovations often enhance economic performance. These 
studies’ suggestions or hypotheses concerning technical innovations are not less im-
portant than those developed in specialised innovation research. Thus, the studies 
that are of importance in our context differ gradually rather than in principle.  Their 
conceptual understanding of institutions and their categorization of technical innova-
tions may differ, but all are interested in the institutional conditions under which in-
novations may evolve, prevail or fail.  
Three groups of studies will be included: socio–economic institutionalism examining 
national innovation systems as its core area; politico–economic institutionalism with 
recent innovation–oriented research on varieties of capitalism; and techno–
sociological institutionalism embracing sociological innovation research in the field 
of technology. The studies are institutional in the sense that they draw on particular 
institutions or institutional constellations as societal meso– or macro–phenomena to 
explain technical innovations. In their majority, they explore the effects of institu-
tions on technology and only rarely do they touch upon processes of institutional de-
velopment or change triggered by technical innovations if and when, for example, 
the complexity of an innovation “necessitates” a regulatory response (cf. Feick and 
Werle 2010). Thus, after years of technological determinism we are now confronted 
with the danger that the pendulum will swing in the opposite direction towards some 
kind of institutional determinism. To escape the potential determinist trap, technolog-
                                                
1  This is an updated and modified English version of Werle (2005). 
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ical and institutional changes must be related to each other and their interdependence 
must be examined. Appropriate approaches can be found in several of these socio–
economic, politico–economic and techno–sociological analyses to be discussed now. 
 
2   Socio–economic institutionalism 
Since the 1980s, socio–economic research has been increasingly concerned with 
technical innovations. In contrast to neoclassical approaches, which treat technical 
innovations as exogenous variables, these studies try to endogenise innovations and 
to discover conducive or hindering factors. These are not necessarily always or in the 
first place market–related factors. Rather, the multifold institutional structures of 
capitalist nation states specifically determine both form and speed of technological 
progress (Dosi 1988: 1148). After several country comparisons displayed striking 
differences and changes in relative economic performance, the attention of research-
ers shifted to national institutions and their significance for the countries’ innovative 
capabilities – thereby assuming with reference to Schumpeter that technical innova-
tions enhance economic performance and growth.  
2.1  National Innovation Systems 
Among the socio–economic innovation studies with an institutional orientation, those 
focusing on national innovation systems (NIS) particularly stand out. Following Por-
ter´s (1990) groundbreaking investigation into the (particularly technological) com-
petitiveness of ten leading industrialised countries, these studies show that varying 
national institutional constellations account for the divergent innovative capabilities 
(Edquist 1997). At the centre of these analyses lie product and process innovations 
within technology–based industries (Carlsson et al. 2002). Inventions and, more im-
portantly, the development and diffusion of innovations are not considered as single 
acts, but instead as processes which are formed by institutional constellations and 
structures that vary among nations. 
Prominent early studies of NIS, such as those by Freeman and Nelson, show that the 
prevailing understanding of institutions is rather vague and extensive, and that the 
concept of institutional systems remains unclear (Freeman 1987; Nelson 1988). 
Freeman describes NIS as “the network of institutions in the public and private sec-
tors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new tech-
nologies” (Freeman 1987:1). In his study of Japan, he alludes to the industrial struc-
ture, the education and training system, the research and development activities of 
businesses, and the long–term strategies of the MITI (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry). Institutions encompass not only legal rules but also organizations and 
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their activities and strategies. Such a broad understanding of institutions and the 
vague system concept are also typical of subsequent studies. In a more recent anthol-
ogy, Nelson and colleagues define NIS as “the cluster of institutions, policies, and 
practices that determine an industry´s or nation´s capacity to generate and apply in-
novations” (Steil, Victor and Nelson 2002: 3).  
At an early stage and in collaboration with Perez, Freeman also developed a classifi-
cation for innovations. Their distinction between incremental and radical innova-
tions is used particularly frequently. Incremental innovations are seen as relatively 
continuous improvements of technology within one line of development. Radical in-
novations occur discontinuously, often as results of strategic research and develop-
ment activities, and lie outside given technological trajectories (Freeman and Perez 
1988: 45–47). 
Both Nelson and Freeman regard institutions as relatively resistant to changes. Hence, 
for the success of technical innovations it is decisive that they fit well into the institu-
tional structures and that these structures have a strong absorptive capacity. Ultimate-
ly, the development and/or quick diffusion of innovations requires compatibility 
(“match”) of new technologies and institutional constellations. As institutions have a 
relatively low adaptability they are treated as part of the selective external environ-
ment which ultimately determines the destiny of innovations.2 These emerging con-
tours of an evolutionary theory of technical innovations are elaborated on more fully 
by Nelson (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson 1987). According to Nelson, the capital-
ist profit motive, the competition among different sources of innovation and the mar-
ket selection constitute the crucial elements of the process of technological evolution. 
The “selective environment” takes effect via market demand and thus determines the 
success or failure of innovations. Corresponding to Nelson’s extensive understanding 
of institutions, this environment also comprises numerous organizations: firms, in-
dustrial research laboratories, research universities, vocational training centres, as 
well as government agencies with their technology and industrial policy. These or-
ganizations, their strategies and relationships vary across countries (Nelson and Ros-
enberg 1993). This also applies to institutions in a narrower sense, such as the, in 
Nelson’s view, crucial rules for appropriating and securing the profit of innovations. 
In the relatively simple evolutionist scheme of variation and selection, individual and 
corporate actors promote technological change by producing innovations (variation), 
while the national institutional systems in the broad sense separate the wheat from 
the chaff (selection). 
                                                
2  Freeman shows that Japan’s institutional constellation was conducive to process innovations and 
led to competitive advantages in the consumer goods industry, in the automobile production and in 
the production of semiconductors. In other areas of technology, Japan lacked innovativeness be-
cause its institutional system was less supportive to innovations. 
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Nelson and his colleagues conducted or inspired numerous studies in which innova-
tive capabilities and activities are primarily measured by the expenses for research 
and development or by the number of patents. Another occasionally used indicator is 
the balance of imports and exports of high–tech industries. These indicators are dif-
ferentiated according to economic sectors and whether private or public, non–
military or military, as well as whether university–based or non–university research 
organizations are involved. Yet, no systematic country comparisons were carried out 
by Nelson, although he studied 15 countries in the beginning of the 1990s. Aside 
from the observation that strong and competent enterprises form the most important 
precondition for an innovative, prospering economy, no generalizable conclusions 
could be drawn, especially with regard to the effects of institutional constellations. 
But it becomes clear that a country’s attempt to copy institutional factors of another, 
in certain areas particularly successful, country is not very promising due to the 
complex and multi–layered nature of innovation systems. Especially, taking cues 
from the US, complementary relationships between industry and university research 
on the one hand and the strongly differentiated (public) research funding on the other 
have been emphasised as crucial for the process of innovation (cf. Mowery 1994: 
79–106; Riccaboni et al. 2003). Moreover, the availability of venture capital is the 
key to rapid commercialization of innovations mainly because innovative researchers 
are now able to leave research laboratories of universities or major enterprises and 
establish their own start–up companies (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993).  
Lundvall developed an additional variant of the NIS–approach. According to him, the 
countries’ historically grown economic structures, including industrial relations and 
their organizational and institutional structures (e.g., of research and development), are 
characteristic for their respective innovation systems (Edquist and Lundvall 1993). 
Within these frameworks, and dependent on them, innovation processes unfold as cu-
mulative, interactive and continuous learning processes (Lundvall et al. 2002). The 
learning processes which ensue from the interactions among producers as well as be-
tween producers and users of technology facilitate especially the incremental devel-
opment and diffusion of innovations (Lundvall 1992). This holds for technical innova-
tions, be they process or product innovations, as much as for organizational changes of 
enterprises or institutional innovations. Finally, Lundvall emphasises that incremental 
changes resulting from learning processes are more important for a country’s econom-
ic performance than the ability to create something radically new. 
Within this spectrum of proposed approaches and perspectives, a large number of 
studies investigate the connection between institutional constellations and technical 
innovations. Although the list of relevant institutional factors remains enumerative, 
the studies successfully show that, in general, firms – securely anchored in national 
institutional systems – are the central agents for innovation and benefit from this sit-
uation. As a consequence this further stabilises the national institutional systems. At 
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the same time, this has the effect that countries continue to be strong in certain tech-
nologies and weak in others. Complementarities emerge between scientific research 
at universities and public research organizations, research and development within 
enterprises, strategic networks of cooperation, public technology and industrial poli-
cy and other factors with the result of pronounced sectoral specialization patterns 
(Archibugi and Pianta 1992; Guerrieri 1999).  
Follow–up studies in the tradition of the NIS approach reveal stagnation of the theo-
retical, and to a lesser extent empirical, vitality. This also holds true for more recent 
studies which were concerned with the excellent performance of the US economy in 
the 1990s (Larédo and Mustar 2001; Steil, Victor and Nelson 2002; also Block and 
Keller 2009). While the concept of national innovation systems can still be consid-
ered very vague, the institutional components are now more strongly emphasised 
than other system elements. However, there is still no clear–cut definition of what is 
systemic in national innovation systems (cf. Carlsson et al. 2002).  
Given these problems, it is not surprising that more recent studies in the NIS–
tradition examine the connection between specific aggregates of institutional regula-
tions and technical innovations, rather than looking at entire institutional constella-
tions. Their main focus is regulations for the protection of intellectual property. In 
the past 30 years, far–reaching changes have occurred, with the consequences being 
discussed in these studies. Most of them concentrate on the United States. Here, par-
ticularly, the possibilities of obtaining patent protection have been extended severely 
since the early 1980s (Jaffe 2000; Gallini 2002). Not only was the period of validity 
for patents prolonged, but also the circle of organizations eligible to file patent appli-
cations was enlarged. It now includes universities and public research organizations 
which are allowed to patent innovations even if they were publicly–funded. More 
importantly, patent protection was extended to previously not patentable fields. In 
this context, the granting of patent protection for living organisms (such as genetical-
ly engineered bacteria), DNA sequences or other biotechnological and genetically 
modified innovations is particularly remarkable. But also the right to patent certain 
software products, which have been protected merely by copyright or not at all in the 
past, has raised numerous research questions. It is especially interesting to under-
stand the effects of improved patent protection on the increase of patent activities in 
several countries and to check whether intensified patenting reflects an increase of 
successful innovation efforts (cf. Gallini 2002: 133). It has been shown that strategic 
patenting and licensing behaviour often generates unexpected and innovation–
hindering effects (Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Hall and Ziedonis 2001). Generally, 
the relationship between the legal opportunities to patent and innovative behaviour is 
more complex than frequently assumed (Bessen and Meurer 2008). 
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2.2  Repercussions of innovations on national innovation systems 
Most studies on the relationship between NIS and technical innovations assume that 
institutions change very slowly and that the diffusion of innovations depends on their 
compatibility with the institutions. Only in the long run and triggered by radical basis 
innovations are repercussions on the system of institutions expected. Freeman and 
Perez (1988) suggest that radical and self–accelerating innovations, which simulta-
neously occur in several technological fields, lead to a drastic structural shift of the 
entire economy. As a result, a change of the hitherto dominating techno–economic 
paradigm can be observed. A new “technological regime” with characteristic institu-
tional structures is established which continues to be prevailing over centuries and 
only changes in long cycles. Hence, in the rare occasion of technological revolutions 
(and usually only then) technologically induced new institutional arrangements may 
evolve (Freeman and Louçã 2002).  
Porter (1990) refers to possible medium–term institutional change as a reaction to 
technical innovations, particularly in technology–intensive industries which play a 
decisive role in the competition of national economies. These industries emerged un-
der conditions originally created by the countries themselves which subsequently 
were influenced by the industries. Driving forces are multinational enterprises which 
are interested in optimally benefiting from the potential of new technologies (cf. 
Pavitt and Patel 1999). Other studies which show that institutional differences be-
tween different technologically shaped sectors within a country tend to be greater 
than differences between countries also point to repercussions of technology on insti-
tutional structures (Carlsson 1994; Breschi and Malerba 1997). The close examina-
tion of such sectoral innovation systems, so–called technological systems, opens bet-
ter possibilities of tracing the interactions between technology and institutions, rather 
than only considering entire national systems (Geels 2004). 
If at the same time technical innovations are analysed in more detail, it renders en-
dogenising institutional developments possible. Institutional changes can at least par-
tially be explained by technical innovations (cf. Dolata 2009). This is indicated by 
research on the protection of intellectual property rights in technologically innovative 
sectors. Graham and Mowery (2003: 254), for instance, characterise the relation be-
tween software innovations and legal developments towards a stronger protection of 
intellectual property rights in the software industry (“software patents”) as “co–
evolution, involving mutual causation and influence.” This corresponds to rather 
programmatic considerations regarding the “coevolution” of technologies and institu-
tions which Nelson (1994) coined a decade earlier. 
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2.3 Results 
Summarizing the state of socio–economic analyses studying national innovation sys-
tems, it can be seen that the influence of institutional variables on technical innova-
tions has been made plausible, but rarely has it been specified. Innovations compris-
ing physical artefacts as well as technological know–how are not examined closely. 
In part, only input factors for innovation, such as public and private expenses for re-
search and development are considered. Regarding the output of innovation process-
es, frequently it is only measured how often or how seldom innovations evolve. 
Some studies count the number of patents (e.g., Faber and Hesen 2004) even though 
changes in the number of patents do not necessarily correspond to the number of in-
novations. In general, technology itself is measured by simple undifferentiated cate-
gories. Most commonly, the distinction between radical and incremental technical 
innovations, as well as between product and process innovations, is used. It is em-
phasised as a general rule that innovations occur surprisingly and that their exact 
emergence cannot be fully explained. This does not contradict the fact that innova-
tive technological developments tend to occur within a “technological paradigm” 
which constitutes a relatively stable path of development (Dosi 1982). 
Regardless of the specific substance of technical innovations, the institutional condi-
tions of countries and sectors can be judged according to whether they facilitate or 
impede innovations. Similar to the pioneering works, more recent studies also stress 
the developmental potential of technologies, the size of markets, the possibility to fi-
nance and acquire ownership rights of innovations, the structure of the respective 
sector, and investments in publicly available knowledge as most important factors 
which trigger and structure innovations. Potential repercussions of technical innova-
tions on institutional structures have gained increasing attention. Newer studies sug-
gest that national innovation systems tend to converge towards stronger market coor-
dination, partly due to external pressure (cf. Henisz, Zelner and Guillén 2005). None-
theless, crucial components of national institutional constellations and, accordingly, 
national differences remain notably stable. 
 
3   Politico–economic institutionalism 
One central shortcoming of studies pertaining to national innovation systems is their lack 
of a theoretical concept of institutions that could be related to and integrated with general 
institutional theory. Instead, institutions and institutional constellations are analysed in 
isolation without examining their potential relations. This is explicitly criticised by Hol-
lingsworth, who argues that the problem is not a lack of institutional approaches, but ra-
ther their excessive supply. With a theory of innovation in mind, he contends that the 
specific components of a society’s institutional structure and the relations between them 
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should first be identified before any statements can be made regarding their influence on 
a country’s innovative capacity (Hollingsworth 2000: 596ff.).  
In his understanding, national and sectoral arrangements of institutional governance 
of production constitute social systems of production which can differ from country 
to country but generally show a certain degree of internal coherence with often inter-
dependent and complementary components (Hollingsworth 2000: 613–619; Hol-
lingsworth and Boyer 1997). Together with the structure and norms of relevant or-
ganizations (especially enterprises and public research organization), a society’s so-
cial production system shapes what Hollingsworth calls its “innovative style.” Ac-
cordingly societies can be more or less innovative, their innovations can be incre-
mental or radical, and they can typically be developed in emerging high–tech sectors 
or in mature industries. While Germany develops successful incremental innovations 
in sectors such as chemistry, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering or auto-
motive engineering, the US has a rather radical innovation potential. In newer indus-
tries such as electronics or biotechnology the US produces – in short time periods – 
completely new complex products which often have a relatively short life–span (Hol-
lingsworth 2000: 626–633). The social systems of production of both countries differ 
with respect to the structure of enterprises, the industrial relations, the vocational 
training system, the financial markets, and the university–based research system. 
These differences are decisive for the diverging innovation styles. 
3.1  Varieties of capitalism and innovation 
Hollingsworth alludes to a set of variables which play an important role in more re-
cent politico–economic research on the varieties of capitalism (VoC). Similar to 
NIS–studies, VoC–research started in the 1980s. The goal is to explain noticeable 
performance differences between national economies focusing not on more or less 
successful public economic policies, but rather on political–institutional factors, i.e., 
different organizational forms or varieties of capitalism.  
Similar to studies about national innovation systems, VoC–research concentrates on 
countries or sectors as units of analysis, but in a more systematically comparative 
way. Research is directed at the global competition of social production systems and 
the resulting institutional change of national capitalisms. Hence, the studies not only 
raise the question of how institutions influence a country’s economic performance, 
but also how institutions develop and change. However, most studies are still fixated 
on contrasting global convergent and national path–dependent development. 
From the outset, VoC–studies have aimed at creating a typology of institutional con-
stellations in order to classify the countries or sectors which are to be compared. A 
classification developed by Soskice in the last decade is generally regarded to be the 
most elaborated. Picking up the concept of social production systems, the author 
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suggests that production regimes shape the rules of the institutional framework, 
which helps the “microagents of capitalist systems” to organise and structure their 
relations with each other (Soskice 1999: 101 ff.). Important elements of this view, 
which focuses on the production side of economies, include the system of corporate 
finance, the various models of corporate governance, the employment contract law, 
the industrial relations, the education and vocational training systems, and finally, the 
rules which govern the relations between enterprises (competition and antitrust law, 
technological transfer regulations, standardization guidelines, etc.). Soskice distin-
guishes two basic types of capitalist economies: coordinated market economies 
(CME) and liberal market economies (LME). In the case of CME, employers are in-
tegrated in a network of associations, coordinating wages, training and employment 
relations internally and together with organised labour. The network has a coopera-
tive spirit and a long–term perspective. This includes corporate finance, which is 
provided in the form of long–term ‘patient’ capital. In the other basic type, the LME, 
short–term market coordinated relations prevail between enterprises, but also be-
tween enterprises and their labour force or their investors (Soskice 1994; Hall and 
Soskice 2001). 
In the centre of attention stand enterprises and their strategies. While the enterprises 
can act autonomously, their actions are influenced and channelled by the afore–
mentioned institutional elements. The results of such actions are hence determined 
by the interrelation of institutional influences and autonomous strategic interaction 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). They are thus never exclusively determined by preferences, 
resources or strategies of actors, or solely by the institutional context. This perspec-
tive is still predominantly programmatic in VoC but almost completely absent in 
studies on national innovation systems. Although NIS–studies regularly emphasise 
the importance of enterprises in the innovation process, they are merely treated as a 
passive “black box”, influenced by “macro–social determinants” including institu-
tions (Coriat and Weinstein 2002: 274).  
Liberal market economy prototypes (within the OECD countries) include the US in 
the first place but also the UK, Ireland, Canada and Australia. Germany is seen as the 
prototype of the group of countries with a coordinated market economy, to which 
Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Japan also belong. When Germany and 
the US are seen as two endpoints of a continuum, all other mentioned countries are 
very close to one of these two endpoints. Still others including the Mediterranean 
countries lie in “ambiguous positions” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 21). On the one hand 
they have a relatively liberal labour market, but on the other their governments 
strongly influence the economy, and their agricultural sector is relatively large. 
Only rarely do we find references to technical innovations in the studies about the 
varieties of capitalism. Generally, the studies’ dependent variable is economic per-
formance, which is shaped by the comparative institutional advantages each country 
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has. Every institutional constellation has specific strengths and weaknesses, and no 
constellation is superior to others in all dimensions of economic performance. This 
also holds for technical innovations, which are considered in VoC–studies mainly 
because they influence the economic performance. Hence, innovations function as 
intervening variables. They are shaped by institutions and – on their part – affect per-
formance. 
Similar to NIS–literature, VoC–literature rather coarsely differentiates between types 
of technical innovations. The central distinction lies between incremental and radical 
innovations. It is argued that enterprises in liberal market economies exhibit a strate-
gic alignment toward radical innovations. These innovations, mostly only patented 
inventions at first, emerge in the new high–tech sectors. Small start–ups especially, 
financed with venture capital, and – though less frequently – major enterprises intro-
duce new products into the market or at least make the products marketable. Due to 
the high speed of innovation, products, which are often components of complex 
technological systems, have a relatively short lifespan. Under such conditions, enter-
prises are committed to short–term profits which they can achieve if they employ a 
staff with a high level of general qualifications. The enterprises must continually and 
flexibly position themselves vis–à–vis changing market conditions. This requires 
adaptable employees and involves high staff turnover. Regarding the specific institu-
tional conditions, this is compatible with LME but not with CME. Hence, LME pro-
mote radical innovations while CME are favourable to incremental innovations 
(Soskice 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; critical Streeck 2011).  
In some more recent VoC–studies, the distinction between radical and incremental 
innovations has been developed further. This facilitates substantiating the effects of 
institutional constellations on technical innovations. One very interesting distinction 
differentiates between “discrete” and “cumulative” (or “platform”) technologies, in-
troduced in a study of enterprises in the German bio–technology and software indus-
try (Casper, Lehrer and Soskice 1999). The authors attempt to explain why, in a co-
ordinated market economy such as Germany, enterprises which work on radical in-
novations may still prosper. They attribute this to the fact that in the area of bio–
technology and software one can find technologies which fit into the German institu-
tional framework. Successful enterprises, it is argued, specialise in cumulative rather 
than discrete technologies. These broader platform technologies develop over a long-
er period of time in a comparably stable way. In information technology, it is not the 
standardised software, but the service segment for commercial users of software. 
These users ask for integrated system solutions that are regularly expanded and up-
dated. From the perspective of technical development, this is a cumulative and long–
term process. The relations of service companies to their customers are also of a 
long–term nature. The service providers’ staff accumulates specific cumulative 
know–how which offers them a long–term employment perspective. Similar devel-
Werle: Institutional Analysis of Technical Innovation 
 
15 
opments have been observed in bio–technology. German enterprises have specialised 
in the development and production of instruments and software which are used for 
pharmaceutical research or the production of pharmaceuticals. In contrast to the end 
products of this industry, they are applied and demanded constantly and hence must 
undergo continuous further development (Casper and Glimstedt 2001; Casper and 
Matraves 2003).3  
3.2  Repercussions of innovations on national production regimes 
One finding upon which all studies on varieties of capitalism agree is that national 
institutional constellations are resistant to rapid fundamental change despite the pres-
sure of globalization. This is due to interdependencies and complementarities of in-
stitutions within the established national constellations (Amable 2000). Recently, this 
understanding of a close link among institutions has been criticised methodically and 
empirically (cf. Höpner 2005). The implication that there are not even niches in 
which innovations can develop, unless they match institutionally, had to be aban-
doned (Crouch 2003; Kitschelt and Streeck 2003; Lange 2009). 
This could reinforce the discussion triggered by Kitschelt (1991) in the early 1990’s 
emphasizing that technical innovations exert pressure to change on national institu-
tions. Kitschelt criticises the fact that research on the performance of national econ-
omies tends to ignore the sectoral differentiation of national institutional arrange-
ments and the structural features of technology. Whether or not a new technology 
can establish itself and develop further depends on corresponding sectoral structures 
of institutional governance. If these structures are missing they can be created to the 
extent that the encompassing national regime structures allow such a change. Within 
the framework of stable national institutions, sectoral structures are hence able to 
change under the influence of innovative technologies. Technical innovations may 
thus promote institutional change towards a national regime structure which shows a 
broader mix of sector–specific institutions and a wider array of national technologies. 
Kitschelt illustrates his considerations by comparing Japan’s development to West-
ern industrial countries. The author strives to describe in great detail the structures of 
technology and the corresponding institutions by using categories which are closely 
related to theories of institutional governance. These include Perrow’s distinction be-
tween loosely and tightly coupled technological systems and between linear and in-
teractive system processes (Perrow 1984), as well as the different types of govern-
ance in Williamson’s transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985). Certain technology 
features such as “asset specificity” or “uncertainty about the causal structure of the 
technology” (Kitschelt 1991: 464), which are relevant for a transaction, co–vary with 
                                                
3  The view that platform technologies possess a cumulative character and can be continuously devel-
oped over years is often challenged (Dolata 2003). However, this does not alter the usefulness of 
distinguishing between discrete and cumulative technologies. 
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Perrow’s characteristics of (more or less complex) technological systems. They each 
require adequate sectoral institutional environments. 
Kitschelt’s strategy is remarkable because he applies a differentiated, yet nonetheless 
rather formal concept of technology or technological systems. This allows systemati-
cally integrating technology into the analysis as an endogenous as well as exogenous 
variable in the process of constituting an industrial sector. The evolutionary variety 
of technology is reduced through institutional influences. However, technological 
systems are still too multifaceted to be regulated efficiently by a uniform national in-
stitutional structure. Therefore, technology–related sectoral governance structures are 
established. No country has general political–institutional preconditions which are 
equally beneficial to the development of adequate sectoral institutional structures 
given the diversity of technological systems. Overall, however, institutional variety 
at the national level benefits the development of technology–adequate sectoral struc-
tures and hence technical innovations, which, on their part, stabilise or even enhance 
this variety. 
3.3  Results 
Most studies on the varieties of capitalism do not focus on technical innovations. 
Whenever they are mentioned, they appear as dependent variables which remain un-
der the influence of specific national institutional constellations. Hence, innovations 
only have good implementation opportunities if they are compatible with the national 
system of institutions, regardless of whether they were developed externally or with-
in their respective country. Different institutional systems promote different types of 
innovations. Whereas liberal market economies tend to produce radical innovations, 
coordinated market economies provide favourable institutional conditions for incre-
mental innovations. 
Some enterprises acting in coordinated market economies have prospered in indus-
tries characterised by radical innovations such as biotechnology or software. This 
surprising fact is explained by further distinguishing certain types of radical innova-
tions. Not all radical innovations are discrete in nature. Some are cumulative or (rela-
tively broad) platform technologies which can be developed and improved continual-
ly over a longer period of time. This is compatible with coordinated market econo-
mies. Only rarely has it been suggested that technical innovations exert pressure on 
institutions to change. In Germany, the development of radical innovations has in-
creasingly attracted venture capital – virtually incompatible with the institutions of a 
CME – which in turn provides incentives for further radical innovations and institu-
tional adaptation. 
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4   Techno–sociological institutionalism 
Both socio–economic and politico–economic analyses of technical innovations gen-
erally fail to provide a detailed examination of technology and its respective stages 
of development. Sociological technology studies differ in that they focus on technol-
ogy in more detail. But sociological technology studies often neglect the institutional 
arrangements in which technology evolves. The traditional rules of technology stud-
ies lack explicit reference to institutions and institutional explanations (Rammert 
1997). Instead, most of the studies share the “enactment perspective” which regards 
the emergence and development of technology as a contingent process of social ap-
propriation exclusively at the micro–level of individual or collective action and prac-
tice (cf. Schulz–Schaeffer 2000). 
Institutionally oriented studies have typically been concerned with the emergence 
and development of technological infrastructure systems or, more general, large 
technological systems (LTS). These studies understand institutions as rule systems 
and focus on the problems of coordination and regulation which emerge during the 
process of technology development. 
4.1  Coordinating innovations through hierarchies, markets or networks 
Based on the generic types of institutional governance – hierarchies, markets and 
networks – specific institutional arrangements, actor constellations and actor strate-
gies are analysed regarding their effects on technology. 
Research on LTS was initiated by the works of technology historian Hughes (1983) 
who analysed the early development of electricity supply systems in Chicago, Lon-
don and Berlin. Such systems do not simply follow technical imperatives in their de-
velopment nor are they exclusively shaped by inventors and system designers with 
an entrepreneurial spirit. Rather, the political–institutional framework is crucial as 
well. Following a phase model, the systems develop from the stages of invention and 
innovation, through technology transfer, growth and competition, to the consolidated 
state of “momentum”. Although the basic technologies for electricity supply in all 
three cities are similar, the systems differ with regard to the degree of centralization 
and integration, and also to efficiency; however, no one system outperforms the oth-
ers in all respects. The decisive factors for the observed differences lie in the institu-
tional conditions which coordinate the process of development. Whereas market fac-
tors were crucial in Chicago, corporatist networks in Berlin and administrative hier-
archies in London coordinated the technical development (Hughes 1983: 175–261).  
The history of technological infrastructures (especially telephone, railway, electrici-
ty) shows that they unfold almost always as public or private politically tolerated and 
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regulated territorial monopolies (cf. Mayntz and Hughes 1988). Large organizations 
internalise the system development and hierarchy has been the predominant mode of 
coordination for a long period of time (Chandler 1977). In general, this institutional 
constellation is conducive to the development of “conservative” technical innova-
tions (Hughes 1982) and it rules out internally initiated radical system changes. Thus, 
far–reaching changes of technological infrastructures are typically the consequence 
of political–institutional changes. This has been shown by Schneider (2001) in his 
evolutionary analysis of the institutional transformation of telecommunications in the 
six most important industrial countries over the course of two centuries. The mode of 
coordinating telecommunications has shifted from state monopolies to more market–
based structures. Deregulation and liberalization triggered a vertical de–
concentration and unbundling of the systems and their architecture (cf. Mayntz 2009). 
The politically initiated institutional change towards more market coordination alludes 
to its superior innovation efficiency (Wiesenthal 2000; Baumol 2002). Hierarchical 
and centralised architectures are transformed into decentralised, modularised and net-
worked architectures. The internet can be considered the most impressive example of 
this transformation process which released the extraordinary innovative potential of 
this technology (Werle 2000). Aside from some coincidental decisions, the institution-
al preconditions in the US in the 1980s and early 1990s account for the quick national 
and subsequent international expansion of the internet. In contrast to Europe, US tele-
communications were already deregulated to a substantial degree and market princi-
ples coordinated the US software industry, while European governments still support-
ed ‘national champions’ and protected them from competition. Moreover, the US 
higher education sector (in which internet spread at first) was also organised competi-
tively to a certain extent. Originally, the internet was publicly funded and developed in 
a protected niche. But it subsequently established itself on the market without further 
public support (cf. Mowery and Simcoe 2002). At the same time, European govern-
ments which wanted to out–compete the US internet promoted national research and 
education networks which developed in a hierarchical institutional setting controlled 
by the telecommunications monopolies. But these networks failed as soon as the inter-
net was allowed to enter Europe and the national telecommunications markets were 
opened for internal and external competition. The internet’s advantage has been that – 
partly due to the heterogeneous institutional context of the US – its generic protocols 
were designed to handle technical heterogeneity and autonomy of sub–networks and to 
interconnect these networks successfully. Conversely, in the hierarchical context of the 
European countries, the efforts of the engineers were directed towards developing ra-
ther centralised technically homogeneous networks which experienced almost un–
surmountable problems when these networks were to be connected to networks with 
different standards (David 2001; Werle 2002).  
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The studies on innovations in large technological systems are generally restricted to 
contrasting the governance forms of market and hierarchy. Analyses of network 
forms of coordination which especially gained attention in the 1990s focused mainly 
on the level of enterprises and the organization of production (Powell 1990; Hirsch–
Kreinsen 2002). The possible influence of networks on the development of technolo-
gy was discovered relatively late. A special type of networks, the so called “innova-
tion networks” which promoted the evolution and diffusion of new technologies 
moved into the centre of attention. These heterogeneous networks connect “technol-
ogy–generating, technology–applying and technology–regulating social systems” 
with each other (Kowol and Krohn 1995: 78). Based on negotiations and trust, they 
help to manage complexity and to reduce uncertainty where markets tend to fail re-
garding the flow of information and where hierarchies fail with respect to flexibility 
(cf. Küppers 2002).  
Rarely is the relationship between the structure of innovation networks and the tech-
nical innovation process specified. Weyer and colleagues (1997) take a first step in 
this direction, analysing in four case studies the evolution and development of the 
European aircraft Airbus, the Personal Computer, the high speed train Transrapid, 
and Satellite Television. The authors argue that successful innovations pass through 
the phases of emergence, stabilization and implementation as independent stages of 
development. From one stage to another the network of innovation–enhancing actors 
changes. In the starting phase, coincidental inventions of innovative actors are inte-
grated into a model which includes the basic specifications of architecture, produc-
tion and utilization of a technology. Potentially interested actors form a network. In 
the subsequent phase, strategic actors set up networks in order to promote the tech-
nology. This step absorbs uncertainty, facilitating the further development of the in-
novation. The innovative idea and the general model lead to a first technological pro-
totype. In the final implementation and diffusion phase, the network opens itself to 
include new members such as users, affected third parties, operators, and also critics. 
New areas in which the innovation can be applied, as well as new patterns of utiliza-
tion are invented in this phase. According to the authors, it is crucial for a successful 
innovation that a network is formed and socially consolidated in every single phase 
of development. These networks must be able to come to necessary decisions and ac-
tively participate in the construction process. Otherwise, the innovation will stagnate 
on the stage it has reached and not move onto further stages. For the successful im-
plementation of a new technology in particular, a rigorous opening of the networks is 
essential (Weyer et al. 1997: 330; Weyer 2008: 189–194).  
Similar to this research group, other studies also restrict themselves to exclusively 
analyse the success or failure of innovations and of the enterprises involved in the 
innovation networks. The development of successful technical innovations appears to 
strongly depend on the formation and stabilization of networks in which actors from 
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different institutional sectors in a certain region such as Silicon Valley work together 
(Castilla et al. 2000). Also, government agencies can play an important role promot-
ing and moderating networks of innovation (Giesecke 2000). This suggests using a 
multilevel approach, especially if the development and transformation of large tech-
nical systems is studied (Geels 2007). 
From an institutional perspective, it is important to note that innovation networks 
link different institutional sectors with each other. This has also been emphasised in 
studies which point to the close connection of institutional sectors and logics of ac-
tion. Some of these studies refer to the innovation–promoting effect of symbiotic 
“triple helix” constellations among universities, industry and governments 
(Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 1998). Others – following Gibbons and colleagues – 
stress the importance of these linkages and networks for the emergence of new forms 
of knowledge generation (Gibbons et al. 1994).  
The networks’ institutional character as a specific mode of coordination is nicely re-
vealed by a study of formation, dissolution and change of networks in the field of bi-
otechnology. Powell and colleagues (2005) analysed these phenomena over a period 
of more than ten years in the US, thereby meeting the requirement to describe net-
works in their dynamics and to identify the underlying mechanisms (Jansen 2002). 
They analyse the effects of changing rules and preferences for partner selection on 
the population and structure of networks. These have changed remarkably over the 
course of time, but the networks have continued to show a high degree of heteroge-
neity. Taking everything together, the development of innovative bio–technology 
depends on the composition and structure of the networks rather than on the fate of 
individual hubs or organizations (Powell et al. 2005).  
It is not surprising that networks are especially widespread as modes of coordination 
in countries with a liberal market economy, and that they are more variegated in 
LME than in coordinated market economies (Owen–Smith et al. 2002). The net-
works, in which actors connect with partners from other institutional sectors, consti-
tute a basis for the development and diffusion of radical innovations. In purely atom-
istic exchange relations, on the other hand, actors working on such innovations can 
hardly survive. But networks as such do not guarantee an innovation’s success either. 
If they were superior in every respect other modes of coordination would, in func-
tionalist terms, completely disappear (Podolny and Page 1998: 66). Not only markets 
and hierarchies, but also networks can fail.  
4.2  Repercussions of innovations on the modes of institutional governance 
The majority of sociological technology studies treat innovation as the dependent vari-
able, while institutions are seen as constant or difficult to change. To establish itself the 
innovation must fit in or be compatible with the institutional environment. Hence, un-
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successful innovations are not necessarily in every respect inferior to successful inno-
vations. They merely do not match their institutional environment as suitably as suc-
cessful innovations might. However, technology is not always and exclusively a de-
pendent variable. Large technological systems are especially expected to influence in-
stitutions and to strengthen their coordinative function (Mayntz 1993). Similarly, 
Krücken and Meier (2003) emphasise that network structures of institutional coordina-
tion and technical innovations are recursively connected to one another. 
More recent technology studies explicitly make use of the concept of co–evolution 
when they analyse socio–technical transformation and transition processes (Rip and 
Kemp 1998; Geels 2004; 2005). The studies emphasise the crucial role of technology, 
particularly of radical technical innovations, in such processes, but reject technological 
determinism. According to the studies, radical innovations are hard to predict and dif-
ficult to shape. Often, they emerge in niches. Generally, the development of technical 
innovations follows its own logic, resulting in pressures on the surrounding institution-
al structures to change. These structures tend to be inert, but some windows of oppor-
tunity are occasionally opened through which changes can be achieved. The innova-
tion process is an interactive, co–evolutionary multilevel process, involving technolog-
ical artefacts, individual actors, organizations, sectoral institutions, and finally, socio–
technical regimes (Geels 2007). Technical and social factors mutually influence each 
other. For the transport industry, the historical process of co–evolution in ocean ship-
ping (from sailing ships to steamships), in air traffic (from propellers to jet aircrafts) 
and in road traffic (from horse–drawn carriages to automobiles) has been traced by 
Geels (2005). The author shows in a phase model, which is more heuristic than ex-
planatory, that usually one technology became dominant for a certain period of time.  
4.3  Results 
In conclusion, sociological institutionalism understands the evolution of technical in-
novations as a result of coordinated efforts whereby the mode of coordination can 
take the institutional forms of market, network and hierarchy. These forms are often 
interlinked. While some studies further differentiate them, the initial typology is not 
advanced systematically. In some cases a correspondence can be found between the 
mode of coordination and the type of technical innovation. The transition to stronger 
market–based coordination, for instance, was accompanied by decentralization and 
looser coupling of telecommunication networks, facilitating the evolution and inte-
gration of radical innovations. Yet, it is still an open question how further internal 
differentiations of the modes of coordination affect technology.  
Sociological technology studies with an institutional background are more interested in 
the development of large technological infrastructures than individual technical arte-
facts. In these studies, technology is not analysed as sophisticatedly as in other fields of 
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the sociology of technology. But a stronger differentiation would not be useful either if 
the institutional concepts are not more differentiated as well. More recent research 
strives to overcome institutional determinism, which exclusively regards technology as 
a dependent variable, by interpreting the technological and institutional development 
as an interrelated co–evolutionary process. In such a process, the dynamics of technical 
innovations can exert pressure toward institutional and social changes. 
 
5   Perspectives: co–evolution and interaction of technology 
and institution 
In the institutional approaches reviewed here, technical innovations are of varying 
importance. Socio–economic analyses are interested in general innovative capabili-
ties, referring to institutional and other preconditions for the emergence and diffusion 
of new technologies. In particular, the studies on national innovation systems argue 
foremost against neoclassical approaches. Technical innovations are endogenised 
and it is shown that different national, but also sectoral institutional systems vary ac-
cording to their quantitative and qualitative innovativeness. Some countries generate 
innovations more often than others, and the innovations can be incremental or radical. 
Usually, socio–economic institutionalism applies a broad and rather inconsistent 
concept of institutions, which has hampered the theoretical development of this ap-
proach. 
Politico–economic institutionalism on the other hand strives for a theoretically sound 
concept of institutions and institutional systems. This approach focuses not only on 
economic performance, and in this context on technical innovations, but at times also 
on institutional change. The regulatory function of institutions moves into the centre 
of attention. Particularly useful has been the stylised distinction of liberal and coor-
dinated market economies. As ideal–types, both exhibit a high degree of internal 
complementarity of their institutional elements, which accounts for their strong sta-
bility. Technical innovations are regarded as important for politico–economic anal-
yses because they influence a country’s economic performance. It has been shown 
that liberal market economies are not superior to coordinated market economies in all 
aspects. Instead, economies prove their specific capabilities with respect to different 
types of technical innovations. Liberal market economies are conducive to radical 
innovations; coordinated market economies promote incremental innovations. 
Politico–economic institutionalism further develops this distinction between radical 
and incremental innovations, which is predominantly used in socio–economic studies. 
To answer the question of why radical innovations frequently occur in coordinated 
market economies (contrary to all expectations), the studies further distinguish be-
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tween discrete and cumulative technologies. The latter can be enhanced step by step 
once a technological basis has been established. In this respect, they fit in coordinat-
ed market economies, even though they emerge, as far as their fundamental basis is 
concerned, as radical innovations. Hence, incrementally enhanced radical innova-
tions may also prosper in coordinated economies. 
According to this perspective, innovations are not continuously regarded as depend-
ent variables. Technologies may even at first appear as exogenous variables, when it 
is argued, for instance, that German enterprises face great problems with radical in-
novations but utilise incremental innovations successfully. Enterprises adapt their 
strategies to the opportunities and constraints of technology. However, they will also 
try to shape a technology according to their own strategic orientations. The resulting 
innovations may exert pressure to change on national institutional systems. Innova-
tions are hence intervening variables. Enterprises use technologies to the extent that 
they can integrate them with their strategies. The integration takes place via adapta-
tion to technology, but also via the technology’s modification and change. As a result, 
the technological opportunity structure will change, and that, in turn, generates pres-
sure on institutional change. 
Institutionally oriented sociological technology studies regard the development and 
diffusion of innovations mainly as a coordination problem, with (large) technological 
systems as their preferred subject of research. Similar to politico–economic studies, 
they predominantly understand institutional systems as rule systems. However, tech-
no–sociological institutionalism usually confines itself to reducing the modes of in-
stitutional coordination to the basic types of hierarchy, market and network. Only oc-
casionally do the studies consider mixed types. This leads to similar problems as 
those confronting socio–economic institutionalism: while socio–economic institu-
tionalism mainly gains a profile demonstrating the weaknesses of neoclassical ap-
proaches, techno–sociological institutionalism is particularly attractive where it 
demonstrates the dubiousness of the notion of a linear development of technology. 
All in all, institutional theory has only advanced rudimentarily. One promising ap-
proach is the so–called actor–centred institutionalism (Werle 1998). It helps to ex-
plain technological changes within a relatively stable institutional framework by 
conceptualizing actor constellations and actor strategies as varying factors of influ-
ence on technology (cf. Schmidt and Werle 1998). 
It is remarkable that techno–sociological institutionalism examines not only success 
or failure of technical innovations, but also the temporal and factual sequence of the 
innovation process and the solution of ensuing coordination problems. The process is 
expected to pass several phases which may recur cyclically. The resulting dynamic 
momentum confronts the embedding institutions with diverging challenges. A given 
institutional constellation which changes only slowly or not at all may benefit or 
hamper the process. 
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The socio–economic, politico–economic and also the techno–sociological analyses 
usually do not scrutinise the details of technical innovations, but instead use simple 
descriptive categories such as radical and incremental. This ‘black–boxing’ – if it is 
not too undifferentiated – facilitates exploring the general relation or correspondence 
between institutional constellations and technical innovations. This holds true at least 
as long as institutional constellations are also characterised by means of general ty-
pologies such as hierarchy, market, network, or coordinated/liberal market econo-
mies. The alternative method to providing a more detailed account of institutions and 
technology has not yet yielded convincing generalizable findings, although the ten-
dency has increased to look in more detail at hybrid or “mixed governance” modes 
(Weyer 2006; cf. also Schneider and Bauer 2009).  
All three approaches treat innovations predominantly as dependent variables, but ap-
parently their development and diffusion is institutionally underdetermined. Many 
other factors affect innovations, too. Moreover, technology–induced factors may ex-
ert pressure on the institutions to change. But the majority of studies adhere to the as-
sumption that institutions are relatively resistant to these pressures. 
Shouldn’t studies in which institutions are used to explain technical innovations also 
consider the inverted causal relation? Some studies mention this possibility. The so-
cio–economic concept of a changing techno–economic paradigm, for instance, postu-
lates that revolutionary technological changes abolish an existing institutional regime 
and establish a new one (Freeman and Perez 1988). From a comparative perspective, 
it is argued that in countries in which new technologies are less successful than in 
others, reform processes are targeted at institutions which are particularly relevant 
for technology policy, which then may enhance the fit of technology and institutions 
(Giesecke 2000). Similar arguments can be found in politico–economic studies about 
“institutional adaptiveness” (Casper 2000). Finally, the sociology of technology re-
peatedly points to the dynamics and momentum of technology which requires con-
ceding that technology has a strong impact on society and its institutional and organ-
isational structure (Dolata 2011). 
Here, the concept of co–evolution plays an important role. Insofar as relevant studies 
using this concept are empirically oriented, they use data and ideas of the history of 
technology. Here the development of technology is conceived of as a process in 
which periods of “social construction” i.e., organizational and institutional shaping 
of technology, alternate with periods of “technological determinism” i.e., technolo-
gy–induced changes of the organizational and institutional environment (Rosenkopf 
and Tushman 1994). 
Particularly in its techno–sociological variant (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels 2005), the 
concept of co–evolution is definitely an interesting approach, since it overcomes in-
stitutional determinism and suggests a way to explain the fact that innovations occa-
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sionally also succeed in a virtually ‘incompatible’ institutional environment. Howev-
er, the concept is very broad. It includes not only technological and institutional but 
also multiple other variables. To further elaborate on the relationship between tech-
nological and institutional innovations, case studies should search for interdependen-
cies or interactions between them. The guiding idea is that technology and institu-
tions change in interactive processes which are mediated and influenced by individ-
ual and collective actors (cf. Werle 2007). But technological and institutional change 
is always also affected by other, from this perspective, exogenous factors. A research 
design focusing on interdependencies and interactions will require systematically re-
lating categories and mechanisms of institutional and technological change to one 
another and, as a by–product, prove to be generally fruitful for institutional theoriz-
ing. It definitely shows a way out of the impasse of institutional determinism, which 
is puzzled by cases of successful technical innovations that do not match the institu-
tional environment. 
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